Clifton Forge, Va. And see United States v. Harris, U. Cruikshank, 92 U. Among the phrases appearing in the opinion are the following: "the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial"; "State laws and State proceedings"; "State law. Neal v. Delaware, U. McNeal, U. Elliott, U. Texas, U. Chicago Union Traction Co. Los Angeles, U.
Cheek, U. Kentucky, U. Holohan, U. And see Standard Oil Co. Missouri, U. Brown v. Mississippi, U. Florida, U. Tennessee, U. See Mooney v. Kansas, U. Powell v. Kaiser, U. Michigan, U. In applying the rule of Erie R. Tompkins, U. And see Bakery Drivers Local v. Wohl, U. Angelos, U. And see Pennekamp v. Harney, U. See Swain v.
Maxwell, Mo. Rowland, Mo. See also Parmalee v. Morris, Mich. Porter v. Barrett, Mich. Home Telephone and Telegraph Co. Bridges v. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, U. Raich, U. Restrictive agreements of the sort involved in these cases have been used to exclude other than Negroes from the ownership or occupancy of real property. See Bridges v. It should be observed that the restrictions relating to residential occupancy contained in ordinances involved in the Buchanan, Harmon and Deans cases, cited supra, and declared by this Court to be inconsistent with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment, applied equally to white persons and Negroes.
McCabe v. Atchison, Topeka Santa Fe R. Gaines v. Canada, U. Justia Annotations is a forum for attorneys to summarize, comment on, and analyze case law published on our site. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice.
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Kraemer Shelley v. Kraemer, U. Justia Opinion Summary and Annotations Annotation Primary Holding Although racially restrictive real estate covenants are not per se illegal, since they do not involve state action, a court cannot enforce them under the Fourteenth Amendment. In , a neighborhood in St. Louis, Missouri enacted a racially restrictive covenant designed to prevent African-Americans and Asian-Americans "people of the Negro or Asian Race" from occupying property in the community.
More than three decades later, in , an African-American family named Shelley moved into the neighborhood without being informed that the covenant existed. Another resident of the community, Louis Kraemer, brought a suit to enforce the covenant and prevent the Shelleys from moving into their house, even though he lived several blocks away. Meanwhile, an African-American family named McGhee purchased property in a neighborhood in Detroit, Michigan that also was subject to a racially restrictive covenant.
Like the Shelleys, the McGhees were unaware of its existence at the time of the transaction. Like Kraemer, one of the other inhabitants of the community, named Sipes, brought a case to enforce the covenant. Both covenants were enforced at the level of the state supreme courts because they were private agreements rather than state action and thus did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
They also found them to be valid under principles of property law such that they were enforceable against later owners and third parties. When the cases were appealed, the Supreme Court consolidated them for review. This was a groundbreaking case at the time because it expanded the scope of what conduct can be considered state action under the Fourteenth Amendment. Since then, many laws at federal, state, and local levels have unambiguously banned discrimination in private residential housing.
Syllabus Case U. Supreme Court Shelley v. Page U. Louis, signed an agreement, which was subsequently recorded, providing in part: ".
In June, , one Ferguson and his wife, who then owned the property located in the city of Detroit which is involved in this case, executed a contract providing in part: "This property shall not be used or occupied by any person or persons except those of the Caucasian race.
I Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider.
In the Missouri case, the covenant declares that no part of the Page U. During the course of the opinion in that case, this Court stated: "The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire Page U.
Warley, supra, declared invalid an ordinance which forbade any Negro to establish a home on any property in a white community or any white person to establish a home in a Negro community, "except on the written consent of a majority of the persons of the opposite race inhabiting such community or portion of the City to be affected.
These are cases in which the purposes of the agreements were secured only by judicial enforcement by state courts of the restrictive Page U. II That the action of state courts and judicial officers in their official capacities is to be regarded as action of the State within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is a proposition which has long been established by decisions of this Court.
Justice Brandeis, stated: "The federal guaranty of due process extends to state action through its judicial as well as through its legislative, executive or administrative branch of government. Convictions obtained by Page U.
III Against this background of judicial construction, extending over a period of some three-quarters of a century, we are called upon to consider whether enforcement by state courts of the restrictive agreements in these cases may be deemed to be the acts of those States, and, if so, whether that action has denied these petitioners the equal protection of the laws which the Amendment was intended to insure.
Because of the race or color of these petitioners, they have been denied rights of ownership or occupancy enjoyed as a matter of course by other citizens of different race or Page U.
That problem was foremost in the minds of the framers of the Constitution, Page U. Shelley, Mo. McGhee, Mich. Justia case law is provided for general informational purposes only, and may not reflect current legal developments, verdicts or settlements. We make no warranties or guarantees about the accuracy, completeness, or adequacy of the information contained on this site or information linked to from this site. Please check official sources.
Justia Legal Resources. Find a Lawyer. Law Students. US Federal Law. US State Law. Other Databases. Marketing Solutions. Were private agreements that imposed restrictive covenants for the purpose of excluding persons of designated race or color from the ownership or occupancy of real property unconstitutional?
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the state courts' decisions upholding the covenants because, in granting judicial enforcement of the covenants, the states denied petitioners the equal protection of the laws.
Although there was no state statute regulating the matter, there was nonetheless state action within the meaning of U. The action of the state courts in imposing penalties or depriving parties of substantive rights without providing adequate notice and an opportunity to defend themselves was a denial of due process of law guaranteed by U.
Private agreements to exclude persons of designated race or color from the use or occupancy of real estate for residential purposes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment; but it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for state courts to enforce them.
A fifth parcel had been occupied by Negroes until a year before this suit was instituted. On August 11, , pursuant to a contract of sale, petitioners Shelley, who are Negroes, for valuable consideration received from one Fitzgerald a warranty deed to the parcel in question. The trial court found that petitioners had no actual knowledge of the restrictive agreement at the time of the purchase. The trial court found that title to the property which petitioners Shelley sought to purchase was held by one Bishop, a real estate dealer, who placed the property in the name of Josephine Fitzgerald.
Bishop, who acted as agent for petitioners in the purchase, concealed the fact of his ownership. On October 9, , respondents, as owners of other property subject to the terms of the restrictive covenant, brought suit in the Circuit Court of the city of St. Louis praying that petitioners Shelley be restrained from taking possession of the property and that judgment be entered divesting title out of petitioners Shelley and revesting title in the immediate grantor or in such other person as the court should direct.
The trial court denied the requested relief on the ground that the restrictive agreement, upon which respondents based their action, had never become final and complete because it was the intention of the parties to that agreement that it was not to become effective until signed by all property owners in the district, and signatures of all the owners had never been obtained.
The Supreme Court of Missouri sitting en banc reversed and directed the trial court to grant the relief for which respondents had prayed. That court held the agreement effective and concluded that enforcement of its provisions violated no rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Federal Constitution.
At the time the court rendered its decision, petitioners were occupying the property in question. Petitioners have placed primary reliance on their contentions, first raised in the state courts, that judicial enforcement of the restrictive agreements in these cases has violated rights guaranteed to petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Acts of Congress passed pursuant to that Amendment.
Specifically, petitioners urge that they have been denied the equal protection of the laws, deprived of property without due process of law, and have been denied privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States. We pass to a consideration of those issues.. Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color is a question which this Court has not heretofore been called upon to consider.
It is well, at the outset, to scrutinize the terms of the restrictive agreements involved in these cases. In the Missouri case, the covenant declares that no part of the affected property shall be "occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property.
It cannot be doubted that among the civil rights intended to be protected from discriminatory state action by the Fourteenth Amendment are the rights to acquire, enjoy, own and dispose of property. Equality in the enjoyment of property rights was regarded by the framers of that Amendment as an essential pre-condition to the realization of other basic civil rights and liberties which the Amendment was intended to guarantee. It is likewise clear that restrictions on the right of occupancy of the sort sought to be created by the private agreements in these cases could not be squared with the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment if imposed by state statute or local ordinance.
We do not understand respondents to urge the contrary. In the case of Buchanan v. Warley, a unanimous Court declared unconstitutional the provisions of a city ordinance which denied to colored persons the right to occupy houses in blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied by white persons, and imposed similar restrictions on white persons with respect to blocks in which the greater number of houses were occupied by colored persons.
During the course of the opinion in that case, this Court stated: "The Fourteenth Amendment and these statutes enacted in furtherance of its purpose operate to qualify and entitle a colored man to acquire property without state legislation discriminating against him solely because of color.
Here the particular patterns of discrimination and the areas in which the restrictions are to operate, are determined, in the first instance, by the terms of agreements among private individuals.
Participation of the State consists in the enforcement of the restrictions so defined.
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