The player pulls and releases a lever. This actuates three wheels or drums in the machine, causing them to revolve rapidly for a matter of seconds.
A variety of symbols are imprinted or painted upon the outside surfaces of the revolving wheels or drums. The internal mechanism stops the revolving drums, and the symbols on each of the wheels line up in parallel designs or patterns, several of which are visible under a glass viewplate on the front of the machine.
Additional special awards are received by a player when the symbols line up in either a so-called "jack pot" combination or a "B. These special awards are not paid automatically by the machine. They are paid by someone in charge of the machines at the time the particular combinations of symbols are lined up behind the glass viewplate. Such awards are paid out of the general funds of The Brotherhood of Friends. The general funds are made up of receipts from all sources of revenue of the club, including receipts from all slot machines operated by the club.
The mechanism of the various machines is set, or the general scheme for their operation is so worked out, ostensibly covering both the automatic and the special awards, so that ninety-five per cent of the coins inserted by the players of all the machines, as an over-all general proposition, are returned to the various players of the machines. This does not mean that every player receives back ninety-five per cent of all that he puts into a machine. The amounts received by some players are obviously greatly in excess of the amounts inserted by them into the machines.
Quite as obviously, the amounts returned to other players are less than the amounts inserted into the machines by them. In other words, stated simply, some players win money; many other players lose money in playing the slot machines. Appellant's gross operating income from its slot machines is taxed both by the state of Washington and the city of Spokane. There are more than two hundred so-called nonprofit clubs or organizations operating slot machines in this state.
Parenthetically, we are inclined to observe that on the basis of the foregoing statistics the aggregate slot machine play in our state over the past several years must run into astronomical figures. Recreational, dining, and dancing facilities are maintained by appellant for the benefit and enjoyment of its members and guests.
The club holds a class "H" license from the Washington state liquor control board. Guest privileges are extended in accordance with the rules and regulations of that board. Mention should be made of the facts relative to the initiation of the quo warranto proceedings by the prosecuting attorney of Spokane county. Three resident citizens, taxpayers of Spokane county, applied to the superior court of that county for a writ of mandate directing the prosecuting attorney to bring an action in quo warranto against The Brotherhood of Friends.
In their application, the petitioners alleged that they had demanded of the prosecuting attorney that he institute an action in quo warranto against The Brotherhood of Friends, contesting its right as a corporation to do business and to operate slot machines, but that the prosecutor had refused to proceed, as demanded, on the ground that chapter permitted the operation of slot machines in clubs such as the one operated by The Brotherhood of Friends.
It was further alleged by petitioners that the operation of slot machines by The Brotherhood of Friends constituted corporate acts amounting to misuser of its corporate franchise, subjecting the corporation to ouster and injunction against the further operation of the slot machines.
In the mandamus action cause No. Noel C. LeRoque, John Finney, Jr. It was overruled, and the prosecutor was ordered to institute quo warranto proceedings in accordance with the application and the relief sought by the petitioners. In compliance with the order of the superior court, the prosecuting attorney promptly instituted cause No.
The case has now reached this court on appeal. Appellant contends that the prosecuting attorney had no authority to institute the quo warranto proceedings. More specifically, it is argued that the prosecutor's interest in the matter did not justify nor provide a proper basis for institution of the action; that the power and authority of his office were insufficient and did not permit him to attack the constitutionality of chapter ; that The Brotherhood of Friends relied in good faith upon chapter for permission and authority to operate the slot machines; that the particular legislation should be presumed to be constitutional until declared otherwise; and that such presumption immunized the corporation respecting its challenged conduct, namely, the operation of the slot machines.
The quo warranto proceeding is based upon Rem. Or where any corporation do or omit acts which amount to a surrender or a forfeiture of their rights and privileges as a corporation, or where they exercise powers not conferred by law. Consideration of the above statutes in connection with the fact in this case that the prosecuting attorney was specifically ordered to initiate the quo warranto proceedings by the superior court which order, incidentally, was not appealed , clearly obviates any discussion as to whether the prosecuting attorney had a proper interest in the matter.
The pertinent question relates not to the right or interest of the prosecutor and the exercise of discretion by him. The sole question is whether the superior court properly exercised its discretion under the aforementioned statutes. If there were any lingering doubts as to this aspect of the case, most certainly they are laid at rest by State ex rel.
Gilbert v. Prosecuting Attorney, 92 Wash. But this cannot be so unless we strike from the statute the clause last quoted. That is to say, the information may be filed either at the instance of the prosecuting attorney or of the court. Clearer terms than those of the statute could hardly be framed to deny a final discretion to the prosecuting attorney and vest an ultimate discretion in the courts.
The statute neither says nor implies that the court may direct the prosecuting attorney to act only when that officer has fraudulently or corruptly refused to act.
It distinctly reposes the final discretion in the court, regardless of the attitude or motives of the prosecuting attorney. As pointed out in Mills v. State ex rel. Smith, 2 Wash. Attorney General v. We reiterate that Rem. Frankly, we think it was his duty and responsibility to test the constitutionality of the statute, particularly in view of the serious questions of substantial public interest involved in the matter. We know of no law enforcement official in this state who could more properly be expected to institute an action of the kind here involved.
The policy inherent in our above remarks and in our disposition of this important aspect of the case is substantially supported by statements found in decisions from other jurisdictions. Some of such cases involve quo warranto or another type of proceeding.
In some of them the state attorney general rather than the county prosecutor was involved. In Louisiana v. Washburn, La. On appeal his action was sustained.
In Wilentz v. Hendrickson, N. Speaking in terms of principle or policy, the court said at p. Gimbel v. Peabody, N. Law , ; Atl. Commenting upon this principle, the supreme court of the state of Florida said in State ex rel.
Landis v. It is a matter of duty. Ellis, Attorney General, v. Bryan, et al. The appellant can take no refuge in this rule of statutory interpretation if in the final analysis a statute is found to be unconstitutional by a court of competent jurisdiction. If a statute is unconstitutional, it is and has always been a legal nullity.
The point is so well established that it should require no citation of supporting authorities. Appellant, The Brotherhood of Friends, acquired no immunity by reason of the presumption of constitutionality, and acquired no rights or standing under chapter , assuming the act is unconstitutional. In Norton v. Shelby County, U. Justice Field, said:. In Drum v.
University Place Water District, Wash. Shelby County, supra, saying:. Norton v. It was no law, and the claim of legislative recognition of appellant as a municipal corporation is therefore without foundation, and must fall. Spokane Falls, 7 Wash.
Appellant's assignments of error Nos. Now as to whether our state constitution prohibits any or all lotteries of any or all kinds and type whatsoever, or is limited in effect to a prohibition of chartered or ticket lotteries, as the latter were known in when our constitution was adopted.
Washington Constitution, Art. The legislature shall never authorize any lottery, or grant any divorce. Appellant contends that chartered or ticket lotteries had a very pernicious history at the time of the adoption of our state constitution, and strongly urges that Art. We are asked to construe this constitutional provision strictly in the light of facts and circumstances claimed by appellant to have existed in It is claimed these facts indicate that the outlawing of chartered or ticket lotteries must have been the sole purpose involved in the enactment of Art.
Appellant is only partially on sound ground. An article by A. Documents , indicates that the operation of lotteries was widespread and flourished in the United States throughout most of the nineteenth century. They appear to have been an accepted phenomenon from early colonial times. They were used to raise funds to build churches, colleges, to construct roads, to assist in defraying the expenses of various governmental activities.
Desirable objects and results were intermingled with most devious and reprehensible ones, the latter involving graft, corruption, chicanery, venal fraud, and outright crime.
In the year , ticket sales in Philadelphia aggregated approximately fifty-three million dollars, involving around lottery schemes being operated in various parts of the United States. See May, , issue, American Bar Journal. Even a casual reference to the history of lotteries in this country indicates the widespread operation of chartered or ticket lotteries, particularly during the 's.
In the first place, we feel most strongly that the language of this constitutional provision is not ambiguous. The provision is phrased in the broadest and most sweeping terms.
It prohibits any lottery. We believe the word "any," given its usual meaning, is all embracing as far as different types and kinds of lottery schemes and devices are concerned. Clearly, its meaning seems to us to be the equivalent of the terms all or every. It is a cardinal principle of judicial review and interpretation that unambiguous statutes and constitutional provisions are not subject to interpretation and construction. Essentially, appellant's argument is that the applicable language of Art.
If the framers of our constitution intended to prohibit only chartered or ticket lotteries, it would have been a very simple matter to have said so in so many words, limiting the prohibition precisely to chartered or ticket lotteries. Quite obviously, they did not do so. Appellant cites State ex rel. Clithero v. Showalter, Wash. A careful anaylsis of the Showalter case does not support this contention. The strongest pertinent statement in the case appears to be from 6 R.
Generally speaking, we agree with this sweeping generalization that consistency in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is desirable. The quoted language from the Showalter case was taken from State ex rel. Banker v. Clausen, Wash. In the Clausen case, a constitutional provision was under consideration after it had previously been interpreted in State ex rel.
Stratton v. Maynard, 35 Wash. Obviously, the principle announced in the Clausen case and reiterated in the Showalter case was, as pointed out above, to the effect that consistency in the interpretation of constitutional provisions is a desirable judicial objective.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. It would, probably, never be understood by the public. Its nature, therefore, requires, that only its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients which compose those objects, be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves In considering this question, [of the extent of Congress' powers] then, we must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding. To the same effect see Justice Story's opinion in Martin v.
Hunter, 1 Wheat. In State ex rel. Linn v. Superior Court for King County, 20 Wn. Accordingly, it should not receive too narrow or literal an interpretation, but rather the meaning given it should be applied in such a manner as to meet new or changed conditions as they arise. We think that in Art. While charter or ticket lotteries constituted a widespread evil and the draftsmen may have had such clearly in mind other types and kinds of lotteries did exist in , and prior thereto.
As a matter of fact, the courts of this country had been confronted with numerous types of lottery other than the chartered or ticket lotteries prior to the time Art.
Negley v. Devlin, 12 Abb. NS NY , concert hall, similar to theatre "bank night"; Hull v. Ruggles, 56 N. State, 38 Ind. State, 49 Ala. Clark, 33 N. State, 2 Tex. In , the constitutional provision relating to lotteries was considered by this court in Seattle v. Chin Let, 19 Wash.
The language of the constitution is mandatory and the provision is self-executing. The question naturally suggests itself, if lotteries for charitable purposes may be lawfully conducted and permitted, why may not lotteries for any other purpose?
We think that the constitutional provision admits of no exception in favor of lotteries for charitable purposes or for any other purpose. Now as to the question of whether a slot machine is a lottery.
We have analyzed from other jurisdictions far too many decisions relative to this question to attempt to cite and quote them all. All of the large group of cases to which we refer have involved the question of whether slot machines are included within the definition of the term "lottery. Multiple lotteries have joined together in lotto games such as Powerball to offer bigger prizes and more chances to win than they would have been able to achieve on their own.
Kuwamoto bought his winning-entry ticket at Eddy's, Locust St. Joseph, Mo. He said he had heard a vicious rumor that I had won quite a substantial amount of money. But soon he received more telephone calls with the same good news. Statewide sales began in both states on Sept.
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